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1 Introduction
One hundred years ago, a single concept changed our view of the world
forever: quantum theory was born [1]. Contemporary technology is based
on implementation of quantum phenomena as a result of this seminal idea.
Regardless of the successes of quantum physics and the resulting quantum
technology social sciences persist in classical paradigm what in some aspects
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can be considered as an obstacle to unification of science in the quantum do-
main. Quantum theory is up to now the only scientific theory that requires
the observer to take into consideration the usually neglected influence of the
method of observation on the result of observation. Full and absolutely objec-
tive information about the investigated phenomenon is impossible and this is
a fundamental principle of Nature and does not result from deficiency in our
technology or knowledge. Now, this situation is being changed in a dramatic
way. Fascinating results of quantum cryptography, that preceded public key
cryptography [2] although not duly appreciated at its infancy, caused that
quantum information processing is currently expanding its domain. Various
proposals of applying quantum–like models in social sciences and economics
has been put forward [3]-[8]. It seems that the numerous acquainted with
quantum theory physicists who have recently moved to finance can cause an
evolutionary change in the paradigm of methods of mathematical finance. In
a quantum world we can explore plenty of parallel simultaneous evolutions
of the system and a clever final measurement may bring into existence as-
tonishing and classically inaccessible solutions [8]-[11]. The price we are to
pay consists in securing perfect discretion to parallel evolution: any attempt
(intended or not) at tracing the system inevitably destroys the desirable
quantum effects. Therefore we cannot expect that all quantum aspects can
be translated and explained in classical terms [12] (if such a reinterpreta-
tion was possible the balance could be easily redressed). Attention to the
very physical aspects of information processing revealed new perspectives
of computation, cryptography and communication methods. In most of the
cases quantum description of the system provides advantages over the clas-
sical situation. One should be not surprised that game theory, the study of
(rational) decision making in conflict situations, has quantum counterpart.
Indeed, games against nature [13] include those for which nature is quan-
tum mechanical. Does quantum theory offer more subtle ways of playing
games? Game theory considers strategies that are probabilistic mixtures of
pure strategies. Why cannot they be intertwined in a more complicated way,
for example interfered or entangled? Are there situations in which quantum
theory can enlarge the set of possible strategies? Can quantum strategies be
more successful than classical ones? All these questions have positive and
sometimes bewildering answers [14, 8]. There are genuine quantum games,
that is games that can be defined and played only in a sophisticated quantum
environment. Some of these quantum games could be played only in physical
laboratories but technological development can soon change this situation
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(the most interesting examples emerge from cryptography). Some classical
games can be redefined so that quantum strategies can be adopted [15]-[18].
This is ominous because someone can take the advantage of new (quantum)
technology if we are not on alert [15, 8]. We should warn the reader that
quantum games are games in the classical sense but to play a quantum game
may involve sophisticated technology and therefore theoretical analysis of the
game requires knowledge of physical theories and phenomena necessary for
its implementation. This fact is often overlooked and quantum game theory
is wrongly put in sort of opposition to (classical) game theory. Recently, in
a series of papers [6, 19, 20] the present authors described market phenom-
ena in terms of quantum game theory. Agents adopting quantum strategies
can make profits that are beyond the range of classical markets. Quantum
approach shed new light on well known paradoxes [7, 21] and computational
complexity of economics [22, 23]. Besides the properties of Nature discovered
by human beings there is a whole universe of phenomena and appliances cre-
ated by mankind. Therefore the question if present day markets reveal any
(observable) quantum properties, although interesting, is secondary to our
main problem of finding out if genuine quantum markets would ever come
into existence. Quantum theory offers a new paradigm that is able to pro-
duce a unified description of reality. This paper is organized as follows. First,
we present some basic ideas of quantum games. Then we describe quantum
market games and review their attractive properties. Finally we present our
personal view of the further development and possible applications of this
field of research.
2 Quantum market games
As we have said in the Introduction, quantum game theory investigates con-
flict situations involving quantum phenomena. Therefore it exploits the for-
malism of quantum theory. In this formalism strategies are vectors (called
states) in some Hilbert space and can be interpreted as superpositions of
trading decisions. Tactics and moves are performed by unitary transfor-
mations on vectors in the Hilbert space (states). The idea behind using
quantum games is to explore the possibility of forming linear combination
of amplitudes that are complex Hilbert space vectors (interference, entangle-
ment [8]) whose squared absolute values give probabilities of players actions.
It is generally assumed that a physical observable (e.g. energy, position),
3
defined by the prescription for its measurement, is represented by a linear
Hermitian operator. Any measurement of an observable produces with some
probability an eigenvalue of the operator representing the observable. This
probability is given by the squared modulus of the coordinate corresponding
to this eigenvalue in the spectral decomposition of the state vector describing
the system. This is often an advantage over classical probabilistic descrip-
tion where one always deals directly with probabilities. The formalism has
potential applications outside physical laboratories [3]-[6]. But how to de-
scribe complex games with say unlimited number of players or non–constant
pay–offs. There are several possible ways of accomplishing this task. We
have proposed a generalization of market games to the quantum domain in
Ref. [6]. In our approach spontaneous or institutionalized market transac-
tions are described in terms of projective operation acting on Hilbert spaces
of strategies of the traders. Quantum entanglement is necessary (non–trivial
linear combinations of vectors–strategies have to be formed) to strike the
balance of trade. This approach predicts the property of undividity of atten-
tion of traders (no cloning theorem) and unifies the English auction with the
Vickrey’s one attenuating the motivation properties of the later [24]. Quan-
tum strategies create unique opportunities for making profits during intervals
shorter than the characteristic thresholds for an effective market (Brownian
motion) [24]. Although the effective market hypothesis assumes immediate
price reaction to new information concerning the market the information flow
rate is limited by physical laws such us the constancy of the speed of light.
Entanglement of states allows to apply quantum protocols of super–dense
coding [11] and get ahead of ”classical trader”. Besides, quantum version of
the famous Zeno effect [11] controls the process of reaching the equilibrium
state by the market. Quantum arbitrage based on such phenomena seems
to be feasible. Interception of profitable quantum strategies is forbidden by
the impossibility of cloning of quantum states. There are apparent analogies
with quantum thermodynamics that allow to interpret market equilibrium
as a state with vanishing financial risk flow. Euphoria, panic or herd in-
stinct often cause violent changes of market prices. Such phenomena can be
described by non–commutative quantum mechanics. A simple tactics that
maximize the trader’s profit on an effective market follows from the model:
accept profits equal or greater than the one you have formerly achieved on
average [25].
We were led to these conclusions by consideration of the following facts:
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• error theory: second moments of a random variable describe errors,
• H. Markowitz’s portfolio theory,
• L. Bachelier’s theory of options: the random variable q2 + p2 measures
joint risk for a stock buying–selling transaction ( and Merton & Scholes
works that gave them Nobel Prize in 1997).
We have defined canonically conjugate Hermitian operators (observables) of
demand Qk and supply Pk corresponding to the variables q and p character-
izing strategy of the k-th player. These operators act on the player’s strategy
states |ψ〉1 that have two important representations 〈q|ψ〉 (demand represen-
tation) and 〈p|ψ〉 (supply representation) where q and p are logarithms of
prices at which the player is buying or selling, respectively [11, 26]. This led
us to the following definition of the observable that we call the risk inclination
operator [26]2:
H(Pk,Qk) := (Pk − pk0)
2
2m
+
mω2(Qk − qk0)2
2
,
where pk0 :=
k〈ψ|Pk |ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k , qk0 :=
k〈ψ|Qk |ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k , ω :=
2pi
θ
. θ denotes the characteristic
time of transaction [25, 26] which is, roughly speaking, an average time spread
between two opposite moves of a player (e. g. buying and selling the same
commodity). The parameter m> 0 measures the risk asymmetry between
buying and selling positions. Analogies with quantum harmonic oscillator
allow for the following characterization of quantum market games. One can
introduce an analogue of the Planck constant, hE, that describes the minimal
inclination of the player to risk, [Pk,Qk] = i2pihE . As the lowest eigenvalue
of the positive definite operator H is 1
2
hE
2pi
ω, hE is equal to the product of
the lowest eigenvalue of H(Pk,Qk) and 2θ. 2θ is in fact the minimal interval
1We use the standard Dirac notation. The symbol | 〉 with a letter ψ in it denoting
a vector parameterized by ψ is called a ket; the symbol 〈 | with a letter in it is called a
bra. Actually a bra is a dual vector to the corresponding ket. Therefore scalar products
of vectors take the form 〈φ|ψ〉 (bracket) and the expectation value of an operator A in
the state |ψ〉 is given by 〈ψ|Aψ〉. A common abuse of this convention consist in denoting
the wave function ψ(p) as 〈p|ψ〉. (A wave functions is a vector in Hilbert space of square
integrable functions and one associates with the variable p an eigenvector |p〉.)
2The reader that is familiar with the rudiments of quantum mechanics would certainly
notice that this operator is nothing else then the hamiltonian for quantum harmonic
oscillator.
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during which it makes sense to measure the profit. In a general case the
operators Qk do not commute because traders observe moves of other players
and often act accordingly. One big bid can influence the market at least in
a limited time spread. Therefore it is natural to apply the formalism of
noncommutative quantum mechanics where one considers
[xi, xk] = iΘik := iΘ ǫik. (3)
The analysis of harmonic oscillator in more than one dimension [27] imply
that the parameter Θ modifies the constant ℏE →
√
ℏ2E +Θ
2 and the eigen-
values of H(Pk,Qk) accordingly. This has the natural interpretation that
moves performed by other players can diminish or increase one’s inclination
to take risk. Encouraged by that we asked the question Provided that an all–
purpose quantum computer is built, how would a market cleared by a quantum
computer perform? To find out we have to consider quantum games with un-
limited and changing number of players. A possible approach is as follows.
If a game allows a great number of players in it is useful to consider it as
a two–players game: the k-th trader against the Rest of the World (RW).
Any concrete algorithm A should allow for an effective strategy of RW (for
a sufficiently large number of players the single player strategy should not
influence the form of the RW strategy). Let the real variable q
q := ln c−E(ln c)
denotes the logarithm of the price at which the k-th player can buy the asset
G shifted so that its expectation value in the state | ψ >k vanishes. The
expectation value of x is denoted by E(x). The variable p
p := E(ln c)− ln c
describes the situation of a player who is supplying the asset G according
to his strategy |ψ〉k. Supplying G can be regarded as demanding $ at the
price c−1 in the 1G units and both definitions are equivalent. Note that we
have defined q and p so that they do not depend on possible choices of the
units for G and $. For simplicity we will use such units that E(ln c) = 0.
The strategies |ψ〉k belong to Hilbert spaces Hk. The state of the game
|Ψ〉in :=
∑
k |ψ〉k is a vector in the direct sum of Hilbert spaces of all players,
⊕kHk. We will define canonically conjugate hermitian operators of demand
Qk and supply Pk for each Hilbert space Hk analogously to their physical
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position and momentum counterparts. This can be justified in the following
way. Let exp(−p) be a definite price, where p is a proper value of the operator
Pk. Therefore, if one have already declared the will of selling exactly at the
price exp(−p) (the strategy given by the proper state |p〉k) then it is pointless
to put forward any opposite offer for the same transaction. The capital flows
resulting from an ensemble of simultaneous transactions correspond to the
physical process of measurement. A transaction consists in a transition from
the state of traders strategies |Ψ〉in to the one describing the capital flow state
|Ψ〉out := Tσ|Ψ〉in, where Tσ :=
∑
kd
|q〉kdkd〈q|+
∑
ks
|p〉ksks〈p| is the projective
operator defined by the division σ of the set of traders {k} into two separate
subsets {k} = {kd} ∪ {ks}, the ones buying at the price eqkd and the ones
selling at the price e−pks in the round of the transaction in question. The
role of the algorithm A is to determine the division σ of the market, the set
of price parameters {qkd, pks} and the values of capital flows. The later are
settled by the distribution
∫ ln c
−∞
|〈q|ψ〉k|2
k〈ψ|ψ〉k dq
which is interpreted as the probability that the trader |ψ〉k is willing to buy
the asset G at the transaction price c or lower [25]. In an analogous way the
distribution ∫ ln 1
c
−∞
|〈p|ψ〉k|2
k〈ψ|ψ〉k dp
gives the probability of selling G by the trader |ψ〉k at the price c or greater.
These probabilities are in fact conditional because they describe the situation
after the division σ is completed. If one considers the RW strategy it make
sense to declare its simultaneous demand and supply states because for one
player RW is a buyer and for another it is a seller. To describe such situation
it is convenient to use the Wigner formalism 3 [28]. The pseudo–probability
W (p, q)dpdq on the phase space {(p, q)} known as the Wigner function is
3Actually, this approach consists in allowing pseudo–probabilities into consideration.
From the physical point of view this is questionable but for our aims its useful, c.f. the
discussion of the Giffen paradox [21].
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given by
W (p, q) := h−1E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
px
〈q + x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|q − x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx
= h−2E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
qx
〈p+ x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|p− x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx,
where the positive constant hE=2πℏE is the dimensionless economical coun-
terpart of the Planck constant. Recall that this measure is not positive
definite except for the cases presented below. In the general case the pseudo–
probability density of RW is a countable linear combination of Wigner func-
tions, ρ(p, q) =
∑
n wnWn(p, q), wn ≥ 0,
∑
n wn = 1. The diagrams of the
integrals of the RW pseudo–probabilities (see Ref. [25])
Fd(ln c) :=
∫ ln c
−∞
ρ(p = const., q)dq
(RW bids selling at exp (−p))
and
Fs(ln c) :=
∫ ln 1
c
−∞
ρ(p, q = const.)dp
(RW bids buying at exp(q)) against the argument ln c may be interpreted as
the dominant supply and demand curves in the Cournot convention, respec-
tively [25]. Note, that due to the lack of positive definiteness of ρ, Fd and
Fs may not be monotonic functions. Textbooks on economics give examples
of such departures from the law of supply (work supply) and law of demand
(Giffen assets) [29]. We proposed to call an arbitrage algorithm resulting in
non positive definite probability densities a giffen. The following subsection
describe shortly various aspects of quantum markets.
2.1 Quantum Zeno effect
It has been experimentally verified that sufficiently frequent measurement
can slow down (accelerate) the dynamics of a quantum proces, what is called
the quantum (anti–)Zeno effect [30]. Analogous phenomenon can be observed
in quantum games. If the market continuously measures the same strategy
of the player, say the demand 〈q|ψ〉, and the process is repeated sufficiently
often for the whole market, then the prices given by the algorithm A do
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not result from the supplying strategy 〈p|ψ〉 of the player. The necessary
condition for determining the profit of the game is the transition of the
player to the state 〈p|ψ〉 [25]. If, simultaneously, many of the players change
their strategies then the quotation process may collapse due to the lack of
opposite moves. In this way the quantum Zeno effects explain stock exchange
crashes. Effects of this crashes should be predictable because the amplitudes
of the strategies 〈p|ψ〉 are Fourier transforms of 〈q|ψ〉. Another example
of the quantum market Zeno effect is the stabilization of prices of an asset
provided by a monopolist.
2.2 Eigenstates of Q and P
Let us suppose that the amplitudes for the strategies 〈q|ψ〉k or 〈p|ψ〉k have
divergent integrals of their modulus squared. Such states live outside the
Hilbert space but have the natural interpretation as the desperate will of
the k-th player of buying (selling) of the amount dk ( sk) of the asset G.
So the strategy 〈q|ψ〉k = 〈q|a〉 = δ(q, a) means, in the case of classifying
the player into the set {kd}, refusal of buying cheaper than at c = ea and
the will of buying at any price equal or higher than ea. In the case of a
”measurement” in the set {kd} the player declares the will of selling at any
price. The above interpretation is consistent with the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation. The strategies 〈q|ψ〉2 = 〈q|a〉 (or 〈p|ψ〉2 = 〈p|a〉) do not correspond
to the RW behaviour because the conditions d2, s2 > 0, if always satisfied,
allow for unlimited profits (the readiness to buy or sell G at any price). The
appropriate demand and supply functions give probabilities of coming off
transactions in a game when the player use the strategy 〈p|const〉 or 〈q|const〉
and RW, proposing the price, use the strategy ρ [6, 25]. The authors have
analyzed the efficiency of the strategy 〈q|ψ〉1 = 〈q|−a〉 in a two–player game
when RW use the strategy with squared modulus of the amplitude equal to
normal distribution [25]. The maximal intensity of the profit [25] is equal
to 0.27603 times the variance of the RW distribution function. Of course,
the strategy 〈p|ψ〉1 = 〈p|0, 27603〉 has the same properties. In such games
a=0.27603 is a global fixed point of the profit intensity function. This may
explain the universality of markets on which a single client facing the bid
makes up his/hers mind. Does it mean that such common phenomena have
quantal nature? The Gaussian strategy of RW [31] can be parameterized
by a temperature–like parameter T = β−1. Any decrease in profits is only
possible by reducing the variance of RW (i.e. cooling). Market competition is
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the mechanism responsible for the risk flow that allows the market to attain
the ”thermodynamical” balance. A warmer market influences destructively
the cooler traders and they diminish the uncertainty of market prices.
2.3 Correlated coherent strategies
We will define correlated coherent strategies as the eigenvectors of the anni-
hilation operator Ck [32]
Ck(r, η) := 1
2η
(
1 +
ir√
1− r2
)
Qk + iηPk,
where r is the correlation coefficient r ∈ [−1, 1], η > 0. In these strategies
buying and selling transactions are correlated and the product of dispersions
fulfills the Heisenberg–like uncertainty relation ∆p∆q
√
1− r2 ≥ ℏE
2
and is
minimal. The annihilation operators Ck and their eigenvectors may be pa-
rameterized by ∆p =
ℏE
2η
, ∆q =
η√
1−r2 , and r. This leads to following form of
the correlated Wigner coherent strategy
W (p, q)dpdq =
1
2π∆p∆q
√
1− r2 e
− 1
2(1−r2)
(
(p−p0)
2
∆2p
+
2r(p−p0)(q−q0)
∆p∆q
+
(q−q0)
2
∆2q
)
dpdq .
They are not giffens. It can be shown, following Hudson [33], that they
form the set of all pure strategies with positive definite Wigner functions.
Therefore pure strategies that are not giffens are represented in phase space
{(p, q)} by gaussian distributions.
2.4 Mixed states and thermal strategies
According to classics of game theory [34] the biggest choice of strategies is
provided by the mixed states ρ(p, q). Among them the most interesting are
the thermal ones. They are characterized by constant inclination to risk,
E(H(P,Q)) = const and maximal entropy. The Wigner measure for the
n-th exited state of harmonic oscillator has the form [35]
Wn(p, q)dpdq =
(−1)n
πℏE
e
− 2H(p,q)
ℏEω Ln
(4H(p, q)
ℏEω
)
dpdq,
where Ln is the n-th Laguerre polynomial. The mixed state ρβ determined by
the Wigner measures Wndpdq weighted by the Gibbs distribution wn(β) :=
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e−βnℏEω∑
∞
k=0 e
−βkℏEω
has the form
ρβ(p, q)dpdq : =
∞∑
n=0
wn(β)Wn(p, q)dpdq
=
ω
2π
x e−xH(p,q)
∣∣∣
x 2
ℏEω
tanh(β
ℏEω
2
)
dpdq.
So it is a two dimensional normal distribution. It easy to observe that by
recalling that 1
1−t e
xt
t−1 =
∑∞
n=0 Ln(x)t
n is the generating function for the
Laguerre polynomials. It seems to us that the above distributions should de-
termine the shape of the supply and demand curves for equilibrium markets.
There are no giffens on such markets. It would be interesting to investigate
the temperatures of equilibrium markets. In contrast to the traders temper-
atures [31] which are Legendre coefficients and measure ”trader’s qualities”
market temperatures are related to risk and are positive. The Feynman path
integrals may be applied to the Hamiltonian to obtain equilibrium quantum
Bachelier model of diffusion of the logarithm of prices of shares that can be
completed by the Black–Scholes formula for pricing European options [36].
2.5 Quantum auctions and bargaining
After tasting the exotic flavour of quantum market games one may wish to
distinguish the class of quantum transactions (q-transactions) that is q-games
without institutionalized clearinghouses. This class includes quantum bar-
gaining (q-bargaining) and quantum auctions (q-auction). The participants
of a q-bargaining game will be called Alice (A) and Bob (B). We will suppose
that they settle on beforehand who is the buyer (Alice) and who is the seller
(Bob). A two–way q-bargaining that is a q-bargaining when the last condi-
tion is not fulfilled can be treated analogously. Alice enter into negotiations
with Bob to settle the price for the transaction. Therefore the proper mea-
suring apparatus consists of the pair of traders in question. In q-auction the
measuring apparatus consists of a one side only, the initiator of the auction.
We showed [6] that the players strategies can be described in terms of polar-
izations, that is the states in a two–dimensional Hilbert space. If the player
formulates the conditions of the transaction we say she has the polarization
 (and is in the state |−→r 〉A = |〉). In q-bargaining this means that she puts
forward the price. In the opposite case, when she decides if the transaction
is made or not, we say she has the polarization |〉. (She accepts or not the
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conditions of the proposed transaction.) There is an analogy of the isospin
symmetry in nuclear physics which says that nucleon has two polarization
states: proton and neutron. The vectors (|〉, |〉) form an orthonormal basis
in H
s
, the linear hull of all possible Alice polarization states. The player 1
proposes a price and the player -1 accepts or reject the proposal. Therefore
their polarizations are |〉 and |〉, respectively so the q-bargaining has the
polarization |〉-|〉[6, 19]. The transaction in question is accomplished if
the obvious rationality condition is fulfilled
[q+ p ≤ 0] ,
where the convenient Iverson notation [37] is used ([expression] denotes the
logical value (1 or 0) of the sentence expression) and the parameters p = ln c-1
and −q = ln c1 are random variables corresponding to prices at which the
respective players withdraw, the withdrawal prices. The variables p and q
describe (additive) profits resulting from price variations. Their probability
densities are equal to squared absolute values of the appropriate wave func-
tions 〈p|ψ〉-1 and 〈q|ψ〉1 (that is their strategies). Note that the discussed
q-bargaining may result from a situation where several players have intention
of buying but they were outbid by the player 1 (his withdrawal price c1 was
greater than the other players ones, c1 > ck, k = 2, . . . , N). This means that
all part in the auction behave like fermions (e.g. electrons) and they are sub-
jected to a sort of Pauli exclusion principle according to which two players
cannot occupy the same state. This surprising statement consist in noticing
that the transaction in question is made only if the traders have opposite
polarizations (and even that is not a guarantee of the accomplishment). The
fermionic character of q-bargaining parts was first noted in [6] in a slightly
different context. If at the outset of the auction there are several bidding
players then the rationality condition takes the form
[qmin + p ≤ 0]
where qmin := min
k=1,...,N
{qk} is the logarithm of the highest bid multiplied by
−1. According to Ref. [6] the probability density of making the transaction
with the k-th buyer at the price ck = e
−qk is given by
dqk
|〈qk|ψk〉|2
〈ψk|ψk〉
N∏
m=1
m6=k
∫ ∞
−∞
dqm
|〈qm|ψm〉|2
〈ψm|ψm〉
∫ ∞
−∞
dp
|〈p|ψ-1〉|2
〈ψ-1|ψ-1〉 [ qk = minn=1,...,N{qn} ] [qk+p ≤ 0] .
(1)
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The seller is not interested in making the deal with any particular buyer
and the unconditional probability of accomplishing the transaction at the
price c is given by the sum over k=1, . . . , N of the above formula with qk=
− ln c. If we neglect the problem of determining the probability amplitudes
in (1) we easily note that the discussed q-bargaining is in fact an English
auction (first price auction), so popular on markets of rare goods. It is
interesting to note that the formula (1) contains wave functions of payers
who were outbid before the end of the bargaining (cf the Pauli exclusion
principle). The probability density of ”measuring” of a concrete value q of
the random variable q characterizing the player, according to the probabilistic
interpretation of quantum theory, is equal to the squared absolute value of
the normalized wave function describing his strategy
|〈q|ψk〉|2
〈ψk|ψk〉 dq .
Physicists normalize wave functions because conservation laws require that.
Therefore the trivial statement that if a market player may be persuaded into
striking a deal or not is a matter of price alone, corresponds to the physical
fact that a particle cannot vanish without any trace. The analysis of an
English q-auction with reversed roles that is with selling bidders is analogous.
The case when the polarization of the q-auction is changed to |〉-|〉 is more
interesting. In this case the player -1 reveals her withdrawal price and the
player 2 accepts it (as the rest of the players do) or not. Such an auction is
known as the Vickrey’s auction (or the second price auction). The winner
is obliged to pay the second in decreasing order price from all the bids (and
the withdrawal price of the player -1). In the quantum approach English and
Vickrey’s auctions are only special cases of a phenomenon called q-auction. In
the general case both squared amplitudes |〈-|-〉|2 and |〈-|-〉|2
are non–vanishing so we have to consider them with weights corresponding
to these probabilities. Such a general q-auction does not have counterparts
on the real markets. It should be very interesting to analyse the motivation
properties of q-auctions eg finding out when the best strategy is the one
corresponding to the player’s valuation of the good. If we consider only
positive definite probability measures then the bidder gets the highest profits
in Vickrey’s auction using strategies with public admission of his valuation
of the auctioned good. But it might not be so for giffen strategies because
positiveness of measures is supposed in proving the incentive character of
Vickrey’s auctions [38]. The presence of giffens on real markets might not be
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so abstract as it seems to be. Captain Robert Giffen who supposedly found
additive measures not being positive definite but present on markets in the
forties of the XIX century [39] probably got ahead of physicists in observing
quantum phenomena. Such departures from the demand law, if correctly
interpreted, does not cause any problem neither for adepts nor for beginners.
Employers have probably always thought that work supply as function of
payment is scarcely monotonous. The distinguished by their polarization
first and second price auctions have analogues in the Knaster solution to the
pragmatic fair division problem (with compensatory payments for indivisible
parts of the property) [40]. Such a duality might also be found in election
systems that as auctions often take the form of procedures of solving fair
division problems [41]. It might happen that social frustrations caused by
election systems would encourage us to discuss such topics.
3 Conclusions
The commonly accepted universality of quantum theory should encourage
physicist in looking for traces of quantum world in social phenomena. We
envisage markets cleared by quantum computer. We hope that the sketchy
analysis presented above would allow the reader to taste the exotic flavours
of quantum markets. A quantum theory of markets provides new tools that
can be used to explain of the very involved phenomena including interference
of (quantum) strategies [42] and diffusion of prices [43]. The research into the
quantum nature of games may offer solutions to very intriguing paradoxes
present in philosophy and economics. For example, the Newcomb’s paradox
analyzed in Ref. [7] suggests various ones. There are quantum games that
live across the border of our present knowledge. For example, consider some
classical or quantum problem X . Let us define the game kXcl: you win if
and only if you solve the problem (perform the task) X given access to only k
bits of information. The quantum counterpart reads: solve the problem X on
a quantum computer or other quantum device given access to only k bits of
information. Let us call the game kXcl or kXq interesting if the correspond-
ing limited information–tasks are feasible. Let OckhamXcl (OckhamXq)
denotes the minimal k interesting game in the class kXcl (kXq). Authors of
the paper [44] described the game played by a market trader who gains the
profit P for each bit (qubit) of information about her strategy. If we denote
this game by MP then OckhamM 1
2
cl = 2M 1
2
cl and for P > 1
2
the game
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OckhamMPcl does not exist. They also considered the more effective game
1M 2+
√
2
4
q for which OckhamM 2+
√
2
4
q 6= 1M 2+
√
2
4
q if the trader can operate
on more then one market. This happens because there are entangled strate-
gies that are more profitable [45]. There are a lot of intriguing questions that
can be ask, for example for which X the meta–game Ockham(OckhamXq)cl
can be solved or when, if at all, the meta–problem Ockham(OckhamXq)q
is well defined problem. Such problems arise in quantum memory analysis
[46]. We would like to stress that this field of research undergoes an eventful
development. Therefore now it is difficult to predict which results would turn
out to be fruitful and which would have only marginal effect.
Recent research on the (quantum) physical aspects of information pro-
cessing should result in a sort of total quantum paradigm and we dare to
say that quantum game approach became sooner or later a dominant one.
Therefore we envisage markets cleared by quantum algorithms (computers)4.
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